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U.S.-Based Fast-Food Restaurants: 
Factors Influencing the International Expansion of Franchise Systems 
 
Abstract 
 
Studies of international franchising are scant, but increasing, and can be divided into 
two streams of research: those focusing on environmental predictors of 
internationalization and those focusing on strategic, firm-level characteristics.  
Examining the latter category, this study empirically explores a set of firm-level 
attributes as predictors of decision-making on whether or not firms seek international 
expansion.  Using longitudinal data from Bond’s Franchise Guide 2001-2008, we draw 
on a sample of U.S.-based fast-food franchise systems to test our hypotheses.  
Specifically, our database is comprised of 1,058 observations of 158 chains and we 
estimate a semi-parametric logistic model for international franchising.  The model 
contributes to the literature by being the first to examine the nonlinearity of international 
franchising determinants using agency theory.  The results show that (1) bonding, (2) 
the percentage of franchised units, (3) the number of states within which the system 
operates, and (4) the provision of area development agreements and sub-franchising 
significantly contribute to the international expansion of U.S.-based fast-food 
franchisors. 
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U.S.-Based Fast-Food Restaurants: 
Factors Influencing the International Expansion of Franchise Systems 
 
Introduction 
 
Decision by franchisors to go global have attracted increasing interest to both 
practitioners and academics since the takeoff in the 1990s of international franchising 
(Alon, 1999), in part as a perceived saturation of the domestic marketplace. Fast-food 
U.S. franchisors like McDonald’s, Subway, Burger King, and others have led the way in 
internationalization and as a result their systems have grown dramatically. For example, 
almost 6 percent of the sales revenue of McDonald’s is generated from its overseas 
operations.  Most major franchisors today are seeking international franchisees (Alon, 
2010).  Dant, Perrigot, and Cliquet (2008) report that 68.74 percent of U.S. franchise 
chains operate internationally. 
Two theoretical streams have dominated explanations of franchising (both 
domestically and internationally): agency theory and resource-based theory (Alon, 
2006a).  Agency theory is one of the primary explanations in the literature.  “An agency 
relationship is present whenever one party (the principal) depends on another party (the 
agent) to undertake some action on the principal’s behalf (Bergen, Dutta, & Walker, 
1992, p. 1). In the case of franchising, the franchisor is the principal and the franchisee 
is the agent.  Agency theorists assume that organizations want to minimize the costs of 
organizational governance, “the costs of aligning the incentives of principals and agents, 
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including bonding and monitoring” (Norton, 1988, p. 202) and they propose that 
franchise contracts achieve these goals. 
Agency theory presents the counterpoint to the resource constraints theoretic 
perspective on franchising, especially the related dark prediction of ownership 
redirection proposed by Oxenfeldt and Kelly (1969) who suggest that since franchise 
relationships are crafted by franchisors to quickly garner scarce resources from 
franchisees, once the systems mature and become resource flush, they will no longer 
need their franchisee partners (see Baker & Dant [2008] for a detailed historical account 
of this premise).  Agency theory suggests that franchising will thrive over time (as 
agency costs rise), whereas resource scarcity predicts the opposite -- that franchising 
will disappear as the resources of the company develop. 
Despite the contradictory predictions of the agency and resource-scarcity 
theories regarding franchising, there is a tendency in the literature to combine agency 
theory with other theories, primarily resource scarcity, to come up with holistic 
explanations of franchising (e.g., Combs, Michael, & Castrogiovanni, 2004; Tracey & 
Jarvis, 2007). Castrogiovanni, Combs, and Justis (2006b), for example, show that 
resource-scarcity considerations are more important when a firm is young, but agency 
explanations tend to dominate later in the lifecycle of the franchise as it matures to 
create a cubic relation between age and the proportion of franchises. Castrogiovanni et 
al. (2006a) recommend a move from resource-scarcity to resource-based approaches 
to understand franchising because resources should be defined more broadly to 
encapsulate the full range of services that are required for expansion by a franchisor. 
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In the international franchising literature, authors also combine resource-based 
and agency theoretic perspectives to develop explanations of franchising globalization. 
Based on Huszagh et al. (1992) and Shane (1996a), Alon (1999), for example, shows 
that franchising internationalization is based on resource-based factors, such as size, 
age, and growth rate, as well as agency factors, such as royalties, fees, and dispersion. 
Previous studies, however, are limited because they only examine linear or log-linear 
trends with fixed coefficients, focusing only on the sign of the coefficient and its 
statistical significance. 
However, by nature the dynamic reality of international franchising is not 
necessarily linear or log-linear.  For example, firms often have to reach a critical size 
before venturing abroad and they may become less adventurous internationally after 
they reach a certain level of experience and scale. Johnson and Alon (2005) show that 
franchisors can be divided into different classes with varying degrees of 
internationalization.  Similarly, in the domestic context, Combs, Ketchen, and Hoover 
(2004) find that placing franchises into strategic groups better explains the relationship 
between franchising and performance. Strategic groups influenced by resource scarcity 
perform less well.  These findings suggest that there are limitations to traditional linear 
empirical approaches to modeling franchising. 
Given the two theoretic approaches in the literature on franchising, we 
hypothesize that the relationship between age and internationalization and investment 
and internationalization will follow a u-shape. In the initial stages of franchising 
development, franchisors focus on building their system and they do this mostly through 
domestic franchising (Castrogiovanni et al., 2006a). At this stage, resource-scarcity 
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considerations dominate. Over time, however, as the franchisor matures agency factors 
become more relevant (Castrogiovanni et al., 2006a). In an international context, 
agency costs are especially high since monitoring is more difficult across space, culture, 
and institutional environment.  We thus predict that when a franchisor reaches a certain 
age, it will be more likely to internationalize by seeking international franchisees in 
foreign markets. 
Given the limited nature of the previous empirical studies on international 
franchising, this study singularly contributes to the literature by examining the dynamic 
nature of international franchising using semi-parametric modeling for the logistic 
regression.  This technique allows us to examine the non-linearity of the data over time.  
Research by Combs, Ketchen, & Hoover (2004) and Castrogiovanni et al. (2006b) finds 
non-linear trends in the predictor variables of franchising performance and ownership. 
Their nonlinear models provide an opportunity to partially resolve the theoretical 
contradictions between resource-scarcity and agency theory.  
Here, the contribution of a predictor factor or a pair of factors can assume any 
continuous function. Essentially, we partition the explanatory variables into the 
parametric group and the nonparametric group, where the contributions from the first 
group (including the dummy variables) are linear, and those from the second group are 
estimated via penalized splines (Ruppert, Wand, & Carroll, 2003).  Using this analytical 
strategy, using a variety of predictors that were previously established in the literature, 
we are better able to show how franchisors reach the decision to internationalize. We 
employ a longitudinal dataset spanning eight years (2001 to 2008), comprised of 1,058 
observations and across 158 U.S.-based fast-food franchise chains to test our model.  
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  We begin by developing a 
theoretical framework, mainly based on agency theory, to identify a series of firm-
specific strategic factors; we subsequently estimate their contributions to the decision to 
expand internationally. Agency theory has been frequently used to explain the 
emergence of franchising. Some of the explanations for the internationalization of 
franchising systems using agency theory were originally developed by Shane (1996a) 
and extended by others (e.g., Alon, 2006a).  The paper concludes with a series of 
implications for future researchers and franchisors. 
 
Agency Theoretic Explanations of International Franchising 
 
A meta-analysis of the franchising literature by Combs and Ketchen (2003) 
reveals that hypotheses grounded in agency theory perform better than hypotheses 
grounded in resource scarcity. In franchising, agency theory is also used to model 
financial returns (Obi, 2005; Brewer, 2003), the proportion of franchising (Alon, 2001; 
Seshadri, 2002; Pfister et al., 2006; Castrogiovanni et al., 2006B) contractual restraints 
(Brickley, 1999), franchise compensation (Vázquez, 2005), power and control (Quinn & 
Doherty, 2000; Pizanti & Lerner, 2003; Dahlstrom et al., 2009), performance (Chaudey 
& Fadairo, 2008), multi-unit franchising strategies and internationalization (Sashi & 
Karuppur, 2002). 
Agency theory portrays franchising as an organizational form that minimizes the 
organizational agency costs, especially the monitoring costs. This is because the 
manner in which earnings are shared between the franchisors and their franchisees 
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motivates the franchisees to be efficient.  Franchisees are “owner-managers that 
typically bear the residual risks of a local operation because their wealth is largely 
determined by the difference between the stochastic revenue inflows to the local 
operation and promised payments to other factors of production” (Norton, 1988, p.201). 
Since the franchisee has a residual claim and ownership in the franchised unit, shirking 
is minimized. 
Shane (1996b) proposes that franchising is a mechanism of minimizing agency 
problems of growth.  He finds support for the hypotheses that (1) franchising provides 
faster growth, and (2) franchising increases a firm’s likelihood of survival.  Because of 
the implied monitoring costs associated with overseeing company managers, the 
increase in potential income that may accrue with direct (or company) ownership of 
franchise outlets may be insufficient to offset the greater efficiency of the franchisee 
(Bergen, Dutta, & Walker, 1992).  
Studies of domestic franchising empirically confirms the presence of agency 
costs and the importance of monitoring skills in the development of franchising.  Norton 
(1988) hypothesizes that as monitoring costs increase, the incidence of franchising 
contracts increases as well.  The two variables Norton (1988) uses as proxies for 
monitoring costs, population dispersion and labor intensity, are found to be positively 
associated with the percentage of establishments categorized as franchise holders.  
Norton (1988) finds support for the principal-agent explanation of franchise contracts. 
Brickley and Dark (1987) find support for the hypotheses that the proportion of 
franchising units increase with the employee monitoring costs and that industries 
characterized by non-repeat customers are less likely to franchise. The second 
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hypothesis reveals the downside of franchising -- the inefficient risk-bearing and free 
riding of some franchisees.  Brickley, Dark, and Weisbach (1991) come up with similar 
results.   
The conclusion of these studies on domestic franchising suggests that the focus 
of agency theory is to minimize agency costs.  Based on these premises, Shane 
(1996a) developed a model to explain the internationalization of U.S. franchising 
systems as a function of bonding and learned monitoring capabilities.  Shane (1996a) 
claims that franchisee opportunism can be reduced through ex-ante bonding 
mechanisms, or a pricing structure that requires high initial investment relative to 
royalties. He thus extends traditional agency explanations of franchising to the 
international environment and paves the way for the future development of international 
research on franchising. Extensions of Shane’s model (1996a) have been developed by 
a number of scholars, including Alon (2006a), Castrogiovanni et al. (2006a), Garg and 
Rasheed (2003, 2006), and Welsh et al. (2006). 
Given the focus of agency theory on agency costs and monitoring skills, a 
number of salient factors have emerged in the literature as potential explanatory 
variables for modeling international franchising.  Our agency theoretic model of 
international franchising consists of a total of seven predictor variables: two variables 
associated with bonding and capital resources (FRratio and logAveTinv), two variables 
associated with franchising experience (Fexp and Franper), and three variables 
associated with geographical locations (logUscale, Disper, and Satur) which, in 
conjunction with the franchising experience variables, can be considered to be 
surrogates for the monitoring skills.  We explain each of these below and propose 
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relevant hypotheses. Given the dynamic nature of a decision to go global, unlike 
previous studies this research estimates semi-parametric spline coefficients that allow 
for variation in the predictors. 
 
Bonding and Capital Resources  
 
The franchising firm controls the ratio between the initial payment (fee) and the 
ongoing payments (royalties).  In this fashion it controls the level of bonding. It has been 
hypothesized that the higher the level of bonding, the less the probability that a 
franchisee will act opportunistically (Shane, 1996a; Alon, 1999).  This is because (1) the 
franchisee fee often accounts for more than one-half of the total investment of the 
franchisee, (2) the franchisee invests a major portion of his/her wealth in the business, 
(3) the standard franchising agreement allows franchisors to revoke the contract without 
returning the franchise fee if the franchisee does not strictly follow the operational 
guidelines of the franchise, and (4) as the cost of termination increases, the higher the 
initial fee is relative to the ongoing fees.  “As the threat of opportunism is greater in 
international franchising than domestic franchising, one would expect to find higher 
franchise fees relative to royalty and advertising rates among companies that intend to 
expand overseas” (Shane, 1996a, p. 77). Shane measures the ex-ante bond as a ratio 
between the initial fee and the ongoing fees and finds support for the hypothesis that 
ex-ante bonding increases the likelihood of internationalization of the franchise system.  
International franchising operations require that the franchisor manage the 
business in remote locations.  Because remote locations have higher monitoring costs 
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(Combs & Castrogiovanni, 1994; Brickley & Dark, 1987; Norton, 1988), franchisors can 
price their business system such that the franchisee bears the greater risks.  This is 
done by increasing the initial investment relative to the ongoing payments, or 
decreasing the royalties relative to the franchise fee.  In this situation the franchisor is in 
the position to receive the franchise fee regardless of whether the franchisee business 
entity succeeds or fails.  The advantage of using this price bonding variable is that the 
ratio is controlled by the franchisor. 
Combs and Castrogiovanni (1994, p. 42) define royalties as the “proportion of the 
present value of intangible resources that cannot be incorporated into the up-front fee 
due to the unpredictability of unit sales.”  Because international sales of U.S. franchising 
systems are likely to be more unpredictable overseas than domestically, international 
franchisors would prefer to receive more of the money up-front rather than over time in 
the form of royalties.  A survey by Arthur Andersen (1996) shows that the initial 
franchise fees of international units tend to be the same or higher than those of 
domestic units, whereas the ongoing payments tend to be the same or lower. This 
finding is consistent with Shane’s finding (1996a) regarding the effect of price bonding. 
Similarly, the total franchise investment needed by a franchisee to initiate a 
venture works as a bonding agent for the franchisor.  In a sense, the total franchise 
investment is the “capital at risk” that the franchisee must put up.  This franchise 
investment, which includes the start-up costs associated with getting the business up 
and running, is in jeopardy if the franchisee does not follow the rules of the franchisor, 
or fails to reach the performance criteria. Alon (1999) finds the start-up costs to be 
positively associated with the internationalization of professional business franchises.  
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Combs and Castrogiovanni (1994, p. 41) have noted that “high start-up costs suggest 
that the franchisee is the primary party risking loss of appropriable quasi-rents.  These 
quasi-rents may actually provide an additional incentive for the franchisee to act in 
accordance with franchisor wishes in order to avoid quasi-rent appropriation.”  Since 
start-up costs increase the effects of bonding between the franchisee and the 
franchisor, the more likely the franchisor is to internationalize, the higher the start-up 
costs.  The significance of the start-up costs is consistent with Huszagh, Huszagh and 
McIntyre’s prediction (1992) that the equity capital requirements of the franchisor will 
emerge as a significant factor distinguishing between domestic and international 
franchisors. 
 The above explanation yields our first two hypotheses: 
H1: The higher the level of the franchise fee to the royalties bonding ratio, 
the more likely that the franchisor will seek international franchisees. 
 
H2: The higher the level of franchise investment that is required, the more 
likely will that the franchisor will seek international franchisees. 
 
Franchise Experience 
Those franchisors that already have substantial franchising experience, either 
through direct operations of a large percentage of franchise outlets or through years of 
operations, are more likely to possess the type of monitoring skills that are needed for 
internationalization. Franchising operations require skills in monitoring remote locations 
that have different resource endowments and varying demands.  As franchising 
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experience increases, firms are likely to develop organizational capabilities, managerial 
talent, local knowledge, long-distance management skills, cultural adaptability skills, and 
host country management skills (Combs & Castrogiovanni, 1994; Fladmoe-Lindquist, 
1996; Norton, 1988; Oxenfeldt & Kelly, 1969). Huszagh, Huszagh and McIntyre (1992) 
propose that international franchisors have greater cumulative experience, scale 
economies, product differentiation, capital requirements, and headquarters benefits, 
thus allowing them to erect entry barriers against new firms and to compete successfully 
overseas as compared to domestic franchisers.  As franchising firms gather more 
experience, they develop the routines and capabilities to monitor franchisees while 
reducing agency costs. Alon (1999) hypothesizes that the more franchised units that a 
firm has, the more efficient are its monitoring and performance-measuring capabilities.  
This is because the sheer volume of monitoring a large number of franchised units over 
time will generate organizational capabilities for more educated routines to identify 
shirking (Huszagh, Huszagh, & McIntyre, 1992).  Enhanced monitoring capabilities 
reduce the incidence of opportunistic behavior by the franchisees, thereby allowing 
international expansion through franchising (Shane, 1996a; Fladmoe-Lindquist, 1996). 
 The more experienced franchisors are likely to have improved know-how about 
activities such as site selection, store layout, procurement, and operations that likely 
yield cost-reduction advantages relative to the less-experienced franchisors (Huszagh, 
Huszagh, & McIntyre, 1992).  Such experience and know-how allow an older franchising 
firm to more successfully transfer its operating system to a foreign market than a young 
franchisor.  Past research (Huszagh, Huszagh, & McIntyre, 1992; Alon, 1999, 2006a) 
support the premise that older franchisors are more inclined to have international 
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franchisees.  When purely domestic franchisors were asked why their firms did not have 
franchises outside of the United States, the number one reason was that the company 
was too young (Arthur Andersen, 1996). Eroglu (1992) proposes that the older and 
more experienced a franchisor, the lower the amount of perceived risk associated with 
internationalization, and thus the more likely the franchisor will seek international 
franchisees.  Huszagh, Huszagh, and McIntyre (1992) show that the age of the 
franchising system is positively related to its decision to internationalize.  “These 
findings imply that experience is still a powerful tool for dealing with the physical and 
cultural distance inherent in franchising overseas.  The inability of technology to 
substitute for experience appears to be borne out by these results” (Huszagh, Huszagh, 
& McIntyre, 1992, p.14).  Based on this literature, our next two hypotheses are:  
H3: The greater the franchising experience of the franchisor, the more 
likely that the franchisor will seek international franchisees. 
 
H4: The greater the percentage of franchised outlets in the company’s 
system, the more likely that the franchisor will seek international 
franchisees. 
 
Geographical Locations 
At least three geographical considerations can be justified by agency theory and 
the previous literature on international franchising: (1) the scale of U.S. operations, (2) 
the extent of physical dispersion of the outlets, and (3) the saturation of the domestic 
market. 
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As firms grow in size by developing additional franchised outlets, they develop 
better skills and more experience in managing and monitoring franchisees, and in 
developing better routines to work with them.  Economies of scale in purchasing, 
promotion, R&D, monitoring, and quality programs can result in cost reductions and can 
increase interdependencies between the franchisor and the franchisees.  Experiences 
in sharing best practices among franchisees and managing across heterogeneous 
locations are likely to engender a desire on the part of growth-minded franchisors to 
venture abroad for new franchisees.   The sheer volume of business experience in the 
larger systems has the potential of generating more educated routines to identify 
shirking (Huszagh, Huszagh, & McIntyre, 1992) and to develop more efficient systems 
to monitor effectively, thereby paving the way for growth through international expansion 
(Shane, 1996a; Fladmoe-Lindquist, 1996).  Monitoring capabilities are likely to be 
especially critical to the success of an international franchisor (Fladmoe-Lindquist, 
1996). Shane (1996a) finds support for the hypothesis that better monitoring skills 
increase the propensity of franchisors to internationalize.1 
According to agency theory, franchisors with dispersed units require 
greatermonitoring capabilities (Fladmoe-Lindquist, 1996). Franchisors with many 
franchisees in heterogeneous locations across the United States are better poised to 
take advantage of economies of scale for promotion and monitoring because such 
locations incorporate differing levels of return and risk (Huszagh, Huszagh, & McIntyre 
                                            
1
 Shane measures monitoring skills as a multiplicative composite index consisting of the 
number of franchised units, the percentage of franchised outlets, and the age of the franchise 
system.  However, he does not propose any theoretical reasons for such a multiplicative 
measure.  Further, since these variables are likely to be correlated, they potentially could 
obfuscate the regression coefficient results. For this reason, in this study we utilize the measure 
of geographical dispersion as a proxy for monitoring capabilities.  
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1992). Therefore, franchisors that are national in scope are more likely to 
internationalize because they have enhanced levels of monitoring capabilities in its 
domestic operations.  For such systems, the foreign subsidiary becomes merely an 
extension to the domestic operations. This is especially true for franchisors that first 
seek international expansion in Canada or in other English-speaking countries.  All 
things being equal, the more dispersed that the domestic franchising operations are, the 
greater the monitoring capabilities, and the more likely the franchisor will seek 
international franchisees. 
There is also a greater probability that larger franchising firms have saturated the 
domestic market and are looking to grow through international expansion (Shane, 
1996a).  The more outlets the franchise system has in its domestic operations, the more 
likely it is to saturate the market and to look to expand overseas.  Fast-food companies 
like McDonald’s, Subway, or Burger King may have saturated much of their market in 
the United States. Early research also indicates that larger domestic franchisors have a 
higher preponderance of units outside the United States (Hackett 1976; Walker & Etzel, 
1973). Aydin and Kacker (1990) show that smaller franchising systems are less likely 
than larger systems to seek international franchisees. Huszagh, Huszagh, and McIntyre 
(1992) also find a significant positive association between the number of units and the 
decision to internationalize.  However, they expect that, in the future, technology, in 
particular telecommunications, will mitigate the influence of scale on the 
internationalization of franchising systems.  A survey by Arthur Andersen (1996) reveals 
that franchisors with over 86 units are more likely to belong to the International 
Franchise Association and to have franchises operating outside the United States. 
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The above discussion yields our final three hypotheses associated with the 
geographical location of franchised units:  
H5: The greater the number of U.S. domestic outlets, the more likely the 
franchisor will seek international franchisees. 
 
H6: The greater the dispersion of domestic outlets across the United 
States, the more likely the franchisor will seek international franchisees. 
 
H7: The greater the level of saturation of the domestic market, the more 
likely that the franchisor will seek international franchisees. 
 
Methodology 
Data 
 
Data for the empirical analyses were obtained from the 2001-2008 successive 
annual editions of the Bond’s Franchise Guide, a commonly used data source for 
franchising research (Dant, Kacker, Coughlan, & Emerson, 2007). The original dataset 
contained a total of 1,124 observations from 179 U.S.-based fast-food restaurant 
chains.   However, not all of the chains responded to each of the eight years of the 
survey.  To improve the quality of the analysis, we made a judgment call to retain only 
chains with at least 3 observations.  Consequently, our analyses are based on 1,058 
observations drawn from 158 chains. 
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The dependant variable “Y” is a dummy-coded (Yes/No) variable which asked 
the franchisor respondents whether or not they seek overseas expansion beyond North 
America.   The predictor variables include two variables associated with bonding and 
capital resources (FRratio and logAveTinv), two variables associated with franchising 
experience (Fexp and Franper), and three variables associated with geographical 
location (logUscale, Disper, and Satur).  The latter three, in conjunction with the 
franchising experience variables, can be considered to be surrogates for monitoring 
skills.  Since there were huge variations among the franchisors in terms of the number 
of U.S. outlets and the average total investment, we log-transformed these measures 
(i.e., logUscale and logAveTinv) to alleviate any excessive influence of certain data 
points.  Table 1 presents the full operational definitions of our measures.  In addition to 
the seven predictors, we include three dummy variables (Area, Subf, and Addunit) 
associated with multi-unit franchising (i.e., the provision of area development 
agreements, sub-franchising, and adding new units) and age to capture the year in 
which the information was collected.  Figure 1 shows the plots of the individual 
predictors against Y, with the lowess smoothing curves superimposed for visual 
enhancement. 
Insert Table 1 and Figure 1 about Here  
Statistical Technique 
 
In the international franchising literature where the response variable is 
frequently dichotomously measured, a logistic regression is the most commonly used 
analytic technique to assess the impact of its predictors (e.g., Shane, 1996a; Elango, 
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2007).  The logistic model is a powerful tool in applied research with the basic model 
being ,)]1/(log[ 0 ∑+=−
i
ii xpp ββ  where )1Pr( == Yp  is the probability of seeking 
overseas expansion, and ix ’s are the predictor variables. The coefficients are usually 
estimated by maximizing the likelihood function and the goodness-of-the-fit is calculated 
by investigating the residuals (McCullagh & Nelder, 1989). A logistic model has been 
quite successful for many natural and social phenomena and is regarded as an 
excellent first-step approximation. However, it restricts the contribution of each factor to 
a linear term with a fixed coefficient. Consequently, most theoretical hypotheses tested 
are concerned with the significance of the coefficient (i.e., whether a particular factor is 
relevant), and/or the coefficient's sign (i.e., whether the factor under investigation 
increases or reduces the probability of the event of interest).  
The actual dynamics of decision-making, however, can be much more complex. 
The contribution of some predictors may be nonlinear and thus the impact of these 
predictors will vary with their different values.  Moreover, since the contribution may not 
be monotone, statements like “the larger the value of the predictor variable, the higher 
the probability the franchisor seeks overseas expansion” are misleading. Sometimes 
two or more predictor variables interact with one another to determine the response. 
The traditional approach to modeling such contingencies in parametric regression is the 
addition of two-way or higher-order product terms into the model.  However, this 
strategy may still be too restrictive.  To overcome the limitations of an ordinary logistic 
regression, we propose a semi-parametric model for the logistic regression: 
  
∑∑∑ +++=− ),,()(0)]1/(log[ lkkljjii xxfxfxpp αα     (1) 
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where the contributions of certain ix ’s are linear, including those of the dummy 
variables, and those of the other jx 's or pairs of ),( lk xx 's are continuous functions 
estimated by univariate or bivariate nonparametric smoothing.  Essentially, we partition 
the predictor variables into a parametric group and a nonparametric group. Hence, the 
label “semi-parametric” is derived from the fact that a combination of both parametric 
and nonparametric components is used in the same model. 
A natural approach to estimate these unknown )(⋅jf 's is to use basis functions like 
piecewise polynomials and splines (Wahba,1990).  For example, Bessaoud et al. (2005) 
incorporate B-splines into the logistic regression in medical studies. In this study, we 
propose using penalized spline smoothing.  Here, each )(⋅jf  is expressed as cubic thin 
plate splines 
  
∑
=
−++=
K
k
jkjkjjj xxxf
1
3
10 ,||)( κµββ       (2) 
where, jkκ ’s  are knots for jx  ((Ruppert, Wand, & Carroll, 2003, Ch. 3.10). The bivariate 
function ),( lkkl xxf  is estimated using a radial basis approximation (see Wand et al., 2005 
for details). Cubic splines are claimed to be the lowest-order spline for which the knot-
discontinuity is not visible to the human eye (Hastie et al., 2001). Usually there is no 
need to choose an order higher than cubic unless the derivatives are of interest.  
Let TjKjj ),...,( 1 µµµ = and let jΚ be the KK ×  matrix with the 'kk th element being 
3
'
|| jkjk κκ − . Subsequently, the model fitting is performed by maximizing the penalized 
log-likelihood 
∑∑ Κ−−−+ jj
T
jmmmm pypy µµλ
3)]ˆ1log()1()ˆlog([
, 
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where the first term is the usual log-likelihood function for a logistic regression, the 
second term is the penalty for the coefficients of the radial functions as in (2). The 
smoothing parameter λ  is chosen via a restricted maximum likelihood.  Procedures for 
the selection of knots have been suggested in the literature (Ruppert, 2002; Miyata & 
Shen, 2003).  There is no material difference between the results with varying knots in 
this study as long as the number of knots is reasonably large to capture the features of 
the data.  Since the data are longitudinal, the ideal would be to fit a mixed effect model 
assigning a random effect to each fast-food chain.  Unfortunately, numerical problems 
prevent us from doing this. Therefore, we adopt a cross-sectional approach. The data 
analyses are carried out using the default setting of R-package SemiPar 1.0 (Wand et 
al., 2005). 
 
Results 
 
Based on model (1), the additive impact of a predictor on the response can be 
quite different from the relationship between an individual predictor and the response, 
as shown in Figure 1, which often is one of the sources for the conflicting conclusions in 
the literature. For example, Figure 1 clearly shows that logAveTinv, Satur, and 
logUscale are positively related to the response variable. But if we run a simple logistic 
regression including all of the variables, their coefficients are negative, with p-values of 
0.0016, 0.0132, and 0.1623 respectively. Nonetheless, a diagnostic like Figure 1 is 
often helpful to provide suggestions as to for which predictors we should use linear 
terms and for which predictors we should employ nonparametric smoothing. 
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Few studies are available to definitively guide us in terms of variable and model 
selection for the generalized additive model. In our study, the test for the parametric 
group can proceed with the usual Z-tests as in the traditional models. The test for the 
nonparametric group can be done by using a 2χ test based on the difference of the 
deviance and the estimated degrees of freedom.  Table 2 summarizes our final model, 
excluding Fexp and Addunit which are not significant at the 5% level. However, we 
emphasize that this exclusion does not mean that these two variables individually are 
not important. Rather, their additional contributions on top of those from the others 
already in the model are not significant. 
For the lay reader and the practitioner, the most effective way to understand 
these results perhaps is to examine the contribution plot with a 95 percent pointwise 
confidence band as in Figure 2. Figure 2 shows the contributions of logAveTinv and 
logUscale respectively, whereas Figure 3 shows the joint contribution of Disper and 
Satur, which may help explain the unexpected trends observed in the literature. 
Insert Table 2, Figure 2, and Figure 3 about here  
 
Conclusions and Discussion 
It has been suggested that to mitigate opportunism, a franchisor may create 
stronger financial incentives by collecting higher-than-usual initial fees, thus creating a 
higher level of bonding between the franchisor and the franchisee. Opportunistic 
behavior by the franchisees can also be controlled through effective monitoring. Shane 
(1996a) finds support that monitoring, measured as a multiplicative composite index 
consisting of the number of franchised units, the percentage of franchised outlets, and 
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the age of the franchise system, is positively related to the internationalization of 
franchising. Elango (2007) captures the monitoring skills through the percentage of 
franchised units and the number of years of the franchise.  In general, the greater the 
geographic dispersion of the franchised units in the system, the greater is the need to 
establish monitoring capabilities.  Hence, franchisors with dispersed units are more 
likely to seek international franchisees since they are used to operating in distant 
locations and accustomed to taking advantage of economies of scale in promotion and 
monitoring (Huszagh, Huszagh, & McIntyre, 1992).  Furthermore, domestic saturation 
provides another powerful incentive for seeking international expansion.  Franchise 
systems with a large number of units in heterogeneous locations are likely to perceive 
saturation.  
In this study, we employ the ratio of the average franchising fee over the average 
royalty rate as the empirical measurement of bonding together with the logarithm of the 
average total investment.  As suggested by past research, we also use the franchising 
experience in years, the percentage of franchised outlets, the logarithm of the number 
of domestic outlets, and the number of states where the chain has outlets to model the 
propensity to internationalize.  In addition, we believe that whether the system units are 
concentrated in a small number of states or are scattered across the country may be a 
relevant indicator of the chain’s monitoring skills and the level of domestic saturation.  
We propose the variable Satur=1−m/n to be a measurement of domestic 
saturation where m is the largest number of units in any single state and n is the 
number of domestic units.  The expansion of franchisors into emerging and developing 
markets has increased the use of multi-unit franchising, which has been shown to be 
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positively related to system growth (Kaufmann & Dant, 1996).  Several permutations of 
multi-unit franchising exist, i.e., (1) area development agreements that assign the 
franchisees a defined territory in which they are expected to develop additional units 
according to a predefined schedule, (2) sub-franchising contracts that allow the 
franchisee to be both the agent to the franchisor and the principal to the other sub-
franchisees, and (3) basic multi-unit franchisee contracts, also called master franchisee 
contracts, that simply allow franchisees to establish additional units in a given territory. 
Three separate dummy variables were created to correspond to whether or not the 
franchisor allows a particular multi-unit permutation.  
Data for all the variables were obtained from Bond’s Franchise Guide 2001-2008.  
These data were collected using identical annual franchisor questionnaires in which 
participation was voluntary.  The dependent variable was a dichotomous (yes/no) 
question which sought to ascertain whether or not the U.S.-based franchisor seeks 
overseas expansion.  Logistic regression is the most commonly used methodology in 
studies with a dichotomous dependent response variable.   
However, logistic regression restricts the contribution of each factor to a linear 
term with a fixed coefficient.  Consequently, most theoretical hypotheses tested are 
concerned with either the significance of the coefficient and/or its sign.  The true 
dynamics of decision-making can be much more complex.  In this paper, we propose 
semi-parametric modeling for the logistic regression, where the contribution of a factor 
or a pair of factors can be any continuous function.  Essentially, we partition the 
explanatory variables into the parametric group and the nonparametric group, where the 
contributions from the first group (including the dummy variables) are linear, and those 
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from the second group are estimated via penalized splines (Ruppert, Wand, & Carroll, 
2003). 
Based on our model, we find that bonding and the percentage of franchising units 
contribute positively to the propensity for international expansion.  Both the contributions 
from the logarithms of the average total investment and the number of U.S. units 
manifest themselves in an interesting “U”-shape, which may indicate a threshold in 
terms of capital requirements and the franchisor’s monitoring capability.  For example, 
the initial increase in the capital requirements may dampen the franchisor’s desire for 
international expansion since it will make it more difficult to attract new franchisees.  But 
after passing the threshold, the large capital requirement may signal the franchisor’s 
strong position in the market and its concurrent desire to expand.  The number of states 
in the United States with an operational presence and domestic saturation also 
contributed positively, as expected, to the propensity for international expansion, but in 
a nonlinear fashion.  Consistent with past research, the permitting of area development 
agreements and sub-franchising agreements were also associated with a higher 
probability to seek international expansion. 
In an attempt to explain this internationalization trend, academics have focused 
on two streams of research: one focusing on environmental determinants (country- 
specific factors) and the second focusing on organizational determinants (firm-level 
factors) that foster the internationalization process.  The first stream of research focuses 
on either country studies (e.g., Alon & Welsh, 2001, 2002) or variables relating to the 
country’s environment which are conducive to internationalization (e.g., Alon, 2006b). 
Although these macro-oriented studies have been useful in explaining why some 
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countries receive more franchising investment, or why a franchisor will select a specific 
country of mode of entry, they are less useful in determining why specific firms within a 
given industry are more likely than others to internationalize. 
The second stream of research, focusing on firm-level strategic variables, is 
helpful in distinguishing among franchising firms that internationalize versus those that 
remain focused domestically within a given industry. Using agency and resource-based 
theory, for example, Alon (1999) shows that the extent of internationalization of 
franchising firms can be largely explained by the size of the systems in a variety of 
industries (e.g., hotels, retailing, professional business services).   
The conclusions in this article are twofold. First, by combining two theories of 
franchising, our total understanding of internationalization is improved.  Second, many 
variables that explain international franchising are non-linear in their effects.  Therefore, 
it is crucial that future researchers examine not only linear, unidirectional effects, but 
also non-linear impacts.  In particular, our research shows that the effects of scale and 
investment are in fact curve-linear and concave, with higher and lower levels having a 
greater impact on the decision to internationalize.  
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Table 1 
Operational Definitions of Variables  
FRratio the ratio of the franchising fee over the royalty rate  ($k/percentage). 
logAveTinv the logarithm of the average total investment  (log($K)). 
Fexp the number of years the company has been franchising.  
FranPer the percentage of franchised units among the total number of units.  
logUscale the logarithm of the number of  U.S. units. 
Disper the number of U.S. states where the company has a presence.  
Satur 1-m/n, where m is the largest number of units in any single state 
and n is the number of domestic units. 
Area indicator of whether area development agreements exist. 
Subf indicator of whether sub-franchising is allowed. 
Addunit indicator if additional outlets within the area can be added. 
DEPENDENT “Y” whether or not the franchisor seeks overseas expansion. 
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Table 2 
 
Summary of the Model Fit 
 
 Coeff. St. dev. Z-ratio p-value 
Intercept -3.7440 1.2300 -3.044 0.0024 
FRratio 0.2596 0.0495 5.246 0.0000 
FranPer 1.4840 0.4703 3.157 0.0016 
Area 0.6390 0.2585 2.471 0.0135 
Subf 1.3450 0.1908 7.051 0.0000 
     
  df   
 logAveTinv 2.897   
 logUscale 2.450   
 Disper, Satur 2.000   
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Figure 1. Individual predictors vs. the response 
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Figure 2. Estimated jfˆ  and its 95% confidence band 
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Figure 3. Estimated joint contribution of Disper and Satur 
 
 
